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THE SEC AT 70: LET'S CELEBRATE ITS
REINVIGORATED GOLDEN YEARS
Harvey J. Goldschmid*
It is terrific to be back at Notre Dame, on this beautiful campus.
This has been a first-rate symposium. In many ways, I wish I could put
away my text-which I won't do-and just comment on the papers I
have heard. At Lisa Casey's request, however, I will comment on
Adam Pritchard's paper specifically.'
Let me start with what I think may be common ground in the
room. The corporate and mutual fund scandals of the 1990s and
early 2000s have been the most serious that have occurred in the
United States since the Great Depression. It is no coincidence that
the past two years have been the most active period in the SEC's his-
tory, with the possible exception of the early years following the crea-
tion of the Commission itself in 1934.
Historically, the great strength of the U.S. economic and political
system has been its ability, in the face of scandal, to reform and heal
itself. Indeed, we have often needed scandals to trigger reform. From
September 21, 1929, to July 1, 1932, when the nation's worst financial
scandals were exposed, the value of shares on the New York Stock
Exchange fell from ninety billion dollars to just under sixteen billion
dollars. Half of the new securities sold on the NYSE in the 1920s
turned out to be worthless, or virtually so. The result was the 1933
Securities Act, the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, and the establish-
* Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, on public service
leave from Columbia University, where he serves as Dwight Professor of Law. This
Keynote Address was delivered on September 24, 2004, at the Notre Dame Law
School's symposium on "The SEC at 70," which commemorated the seventieth
anniversary of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
1 The views expressed herein are Commissioner Goldschmid's and do not neces-
sarily represent the views of the Commission, his fellow Commissioners, or the Com-
mission staff.
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ment of the SEC. These acts and the Commission itself remain the
fundamental foundations that make our securities regulation system
work today.
In historical context, there were reform proposals before
1933-1934. Woodrow Wilson proposed securities laws in 1918-1919,
knowing that securities speculation would come after World War I.
There were bills introduced from 1919 through 1927, but all were
given almost no attention. It took the scandals of the 1920s and early
1930s to bring about reform.
Now, my remarks today are titled, The SEC at 70: Let's Celebrate Its
Reinvigorated Golden Years. I added "reinvigorated" so Adam Pritchard
would not equate "golden years" with feeble old age. Walking over, I
asked Adam: "Would you mind if I called you a young academic cur-
mudgeon?" Adam graciously said it would be okay. The curmudgeon
reference and my title suggest my emphatic rejection of Professor
Pritchard's "time-for-retirement" theme. But let me come back to
that. I have great respect and affection for Adam, who was at the
Commission a short time while I was there as General Counsel in
1998.
My remarks today come in two basic parts. First, I will provide a
"progress report" on what the Commission has been doing during the
past two years to respond to the scandals of the 1990s and early 2000s.
I believe that the Commission's rulemakings (undertaken, in part, to
implement and build upon the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and enforcement
efforts have gone far towards restoring investor faith in the integrity
and fairness of our financial markets. At the end of this first part, I'll
comment on Adam Pritchard's paper. Second, I will provide a sense,
but only a sense, of the major agenda items with which the Commis-
sion still must grapple.
Let me begin by stating bluntly the basic bottom line (at least for
me) of the scandals of the 1990s and early 2000s. We have witnessed a
systemic failure. The checks and balances that we thought would be
provided by independent directors, independent auditors, securities
analysts, commercial and investment bankers, lawyers, and compli-
ance personnel (particularly for mutual funds) too often failed. Dur-
ing the past two years, serious SEC rulemakings and enforcement
efforts have come in each of these areas.
The first item on my "progress report" relates to certifications.
Sarbanes-Oxley required them in various circumstances, but the Com-
mission added to those requirements; they have been built into a
good deal of what we have done. In reality, certifications do not add
significant additional legal exposure. The certifications in Sarbanes-
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Oxley-leaving criminal prosecutions aside (which only cover hard-
core wrongdoing) -basically pick up what was already in the law.
When I was General Counsel of the SEC in 1998-1999, there was
a private case on appeal from a California district court. The CEO in
that case was willing to concede-at least during motions practice-
that the financials were materially misleading, that they had been in-
tentionally falsified, and that he had signed them. His defense was:
"But you can't hold me liable, because I didn't read them." The dis-
trictjudge bought the defense. I instructed the Commission's staff to
write an amicus brief, which could be very short. All it had to say was:
"If you sign it, you take legal responsibility for it." That is what the
Ninth Circuit held in Howard v. Everex Systems, Inc.2 It is also what any
sensible court would hold, and it provides the basic legal background
to CEO and CFO certifications.
I don't doubt that certifications have greatly enhanced the quality
of corporate disclosure in the United States. But they have enhanced
it because of spotlighting an issue for CEOs, CFOs, and other senior
managers-who now understand the importance of their signatures
and have demanded that others further down in the company re-
spond accordingly-not because of new legal exposures.
The panel this morning talked about corporate governance steps
taken by the SEC. The most significant area has been the audit com-
mittee. The key role of the audit committee is an old SEC theme. It
goes back to 1940 and a McKesson & Robbins investigation. The fo-
cus here is making sure that dispassionate, independent members of
the board monitor the company's management and its independent
auditor to help to ensure that the company is neither cutting too close
to, nor crossing over, a GAAP or other disclosure line.
What the SEC did with respect to audit committees-in imple-
menting and building on Sarbanes-Oxley in April 2003-was to
strengthen what had already been established under former SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt. There had been a Blue Ribbon Committee
that recommended effective reforms in 1998-1999. Its recommenda-
tions were adopted through listing requirements, SEC disclosure re-
quirements, and accounting industry measures. In April 2003, the
SEC built on the Blue Ribbon Committee's definition of indepen-
dence for audit committee members. Interestingly, when that Blue
Ribbon Committee reported in 1999, it recommended that the audit
committee take "ultimate responsibility"-words used by the Ameri-
2 228 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000).
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can Law Institute in the Principles of Corporate Governance 3-for the hir-
ing, the evaluation, and the firing, if appropriate, of the outside
auditor.
As some in the corporate community read the new listing rule,
they saw "ultimate responsibility" as somehow only compelling the au-
dit committee to oversee the audit process, at roughly forty thousand
feet, rather than to take hands-on responsibility. Listed corporations
too often continued to hire and evaluate auditors in the traditional
way: with management making the calls. Therefore, auditor loyalties
were still being focused on management and not on independent di-
rectors. Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC implementing rules contain very
powerful language, requiring the audit committee to take "direct re-
sponsibility" for the hiring, evaluation, compensation, and, where ap-
propriate, firing of the independent auditor. This "direct
responsibility" requirement, I believe, is producing a dramatic change
in the outlook of auditors and audit committees.
We talked about section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and inter-
nal controls this morning. Let me touch just a bit on the comments
we heard. Section 404 is correctly described as the one (though I em-
phasize the word "one") large-dollar-cost item that comes out of
Sarbanes-Oxley. The rest of the cost complaints are largely fanciful or
involve relatively small amounts. Section 404 is the one big-dollar
item. On the other hand, as the Chairman of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, Bill McDonough, correctly keeps put-
ting it: "How can you have a strong reporting and disclosure system-
or corporation-without strong internal controls? Won't the expense
be worth it?"
Now, the PCAOB worked very hard to create fair and balanced
internal control standards for auditors. It may be that by the spring or
summer of 2005 we will have had enough experience with these provi-
sions to evaluate how well they are working. Corrections that retain
effectiveness-while removing wasteful wheel-spinning-should cer-
tainly be made. There is, for example, a legitimate issue about
whether the framework for internal controls works as well for smaller
public companies as it does for larger ones. Perhaps some costly re-
quirements can be modified or removed without sacrificing effective-
ness. But there is no question in my mind that public corporations
need truly effective internal controls over financial reporting. The
benefits are so large that the cost is clearly worthwhile for individual
companies, investors of all types, and our financial system as a whole.
3 See I PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§§ 3.02, 3.05 (1994).
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Let me turn to the SEC's enforcement program. Sarbanes-Oxley
gave the SEC enhanced powers with respect to civil penalties, dis-
gorgement, officer and director bars, and equitable remedies. In ad-
dition, more powerful substantive criminal provisions and sanctions
were provided to the Department of Justice. What Congress recog-
nized with Sarbanes-Oxley is that if our securities regulatory system is
to work, corporations and other entities, the individuals who comprise
them, and the various "gatekeepers" in our system must know that
they are likely to be held accountable for wrongdoing. Effective deter-
rence requires a strong, credible threat. It is that "threat" that creates
powerful incentives to avoid wrongful acts and to bring about the cul-
tural, procedural, and process changes necessary to restore integrity
and protect investors. For me, accountability and deterrence are the
key words in the Commission's enforcement approach today.
Let me give you a feel for how important enforcement has be-
come in the Commission's reform efforts. When I went back to Co-
lumbia Law School after having served as the SEC's General Counsel
in 1998-1999, I'd indicated to a class that the SEC could bring
roughly 350 to 450 cases a year. These covered a broad landscape,
including cases involving broker-dealers, investment advisers, insider
traders, and disclosure failures. In fiscal year (FY) 2001 (the fiscal
year ends on September 30 for the government), the SEC had already
become more active. The number of enforcement cases that year had
risen to 484. In FY 2003, the SEC brought 679 cases. In general, these
cases were more important, larger, and more complex than those
brought in earlier years. With respect to financial fraud, in FY 2001,
which was a big year, the SEC brought 112 cases. In FY 2003, the
number was 199.
Officer and director bars are a powerful deterrence tool. An of-
ficer and director bar means that you cannot serve in a public corpo-
ration again as an officer or a director, or that there is a time frame
during which you cannot serve. In FY 2001, there were fifty-one of
these bars. In FY 2003, the number had reached 170. I have not
looked at the FY 2004 figures (the year is just closing), but I suspect
they will be roughly the same as 2003.
In terms of civil money penalties and disgorgements, the num-
bers are off the page. In FY 2002, the SEC exacted its first ten million
dollar civil money penalty from a public corporation. There were
twenty penalties of ten million dollars or higher in FY 2003, and the
number will be even higher in 2004. In terms of the dollars involved,
in FY 2003, the amount of civil penalties collected by the SEC was
higher than during the prior fifteen years combined. Also, in terms of
deterrence and accountability values, SEC policy now prevents civil
2005]
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money penalties from being insured, indemnified, or used for a tax
deduction. If you-an individual or an entity-are a serious wrong-
doer, you will be hit in your own pocket and will be unable to pass the
penalty on.
In the criminal area (which is not my area of expertise), let me
give you some feel for enforcement policy. Clearly, we should use the
criminal laws carefully, but there is no more powerful deterrent than
the criminal laws when appropriately used. In 1998-1999, Arthur Lev-
itt crisscrossed the nation trying to get U.S. Attorneys interested in
prosecuting hard-core fraud. The U.S. Attorneys never put it quite
this way, but, I suspect, they were saying under their breaths: "These
cases are major resource users. They are unglamorous. They are dull.
Please take them elsewhere." The "elsewhere" was often the Southern
District of New York and a few other jurisdictions, but, in general, very
few U.S. Attorneys were willing to bring criminal securities cases, even
in the most willful, hard-core areas. In FY 2003, there were 246 de-
fendants indicted for SEC-related criminal activity. But the fascinat-
ing figure for me is that there were forty-eight different criminal
authorities bringing those cases.
Now the large number of criminal authorities willing to prosecute
hard-core wrongdoers, and the high-profile of the cases today, brings
something very important to mind. There is a basic need for care so
that we make sure that the criminal laws are used only for willful, ve-
nal activity. The SEC works with U.S. Attorneys to help ensure appro-
priate balance in the use of the criminal laws.
And I hasten to add that fairness, proportionality, and culpability
continue to count. This system will not work unless good people con-
tinue to serve as officers and directors of public corporations. We
must not unfairly frighten them away from serving.
I must emphasize that nobody at the SEC wants to diminish or
interfere with risk-taking, with corporate entrepreneurial activity, or
with appropriate corporate autonomy. From corporate risk-taking
can come new products, innovation, efficiency, and healthy change.
No case, to my knowledge (and I think I know of each and every one),
has been brought that second-guesses honest business decisions of di-
rectors or officers. A fair number of business decisions to develop
new plants or products-or otherwise innovate-aren't going to work
out. No one is second-guessing those decisions. The message from
the SEC is: if a business decision goes well, report it accurately in your
financials; normally, that is easy to get people to do. If it goes badly,
report that accurately as well. If you do that, we don't care that it went
bad. Numbers of business decisions, as I keep saying, will go bad. But
other decisions involving risk will lead to healthy change, to dyna-
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mism, to new products, and to all of the entrepreneurial things we
need in the U.S. economy.
On the accounting profession, as I'm trying to move quickly in
explaining what we have been doing, the new PCAOB is a godsend to
the economy, the quality of our disclosure, and to the accounting pro-
fession itself. As Joel Seligman began to say in an earlier session, the
PCAOB was needed because there had been a basic failure of self-
regulation in the accounting profession. The disciplinary system
didn't work; the rulemaking and quality review systems were highly
questionable. The PCAOB now has the power to make everything
work. It has a serious disciplinary process, but, even more impor-
tantly, the PCAOB is developing high standards for quality control
and rulemaking.
Bill McDonough and his colleagues are a first-rate group. As is
obvious, I am very optimistic about the role being played by the
PCAOB. Indeed, my sense is that Sarbanes-Oxley, various SEC initia-
tives, the PCAOB, and the accounting profession's own efforts are
now making a large difference. These combined steps have put us on
the road to restoring the credibility, honor, and luster of the account-
ing profession.
Now let me turn to Adam Pritchard's paper. I have great respect
for Adam, although his provocative paper obviously raised some ques-
tions in my mind. Unfortunately, I have time only to touch a few basic
points. Adam argues that the Commission, an independent agency
and not part of the administration or executive branch, is indepen-
dent in name only, due to its dependence on Congress and industry.
He wants to put me out of work by getting rid of the Commissioners,
though I kept my tenure at Columbia, so I am okay. He maintains
that greater independence can be achieved by abolishing the SEC and
having its functions and staff incorporated into the Treasury and De-
partment of Justice where, answerable only to the President, it would
be less vulnerable to business pressure, industry capture, and political
whim. Moreover, Adam asserts that the close connection between the
SEC and Congress "fuels [a] cyclical pattern of neglect and hysterical
overreaction."
4
My discussion so far indicates my profound disagreement with
Adam's last point. Neither in 1933-1934, nor in 2002 in Sarbanes-
Oxley, was there "hysterical overreaction." Indeed, in the 1930s, and
again in 2002, Congress provided critically important frameworks for
maintaining and enhancing the public's faith in the integrity and fair-
4 A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1071, 1074 (2005).
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ness of our financial markets. Nothing is more important to capital
formation and to the overall strength of the nation's economy.
On the second point, in terms of the quiet life that I would like to
lead, I wish Adam would convince the Business Roundtable, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, and much of the financial community that
the SEC has been captured by business interests. Neither they nor I
see any current validity in the claim. As a historical matter, Joel Selig-
man, the author of The Transformation of Wall Street, which is the defini-
tive history of the SEC, wisely concluded: "Few have suggested
seriously that the SEC has been a 'captive' of the industries it regu-
lates. Quite simply, such a suggestion cannot be sustained by a reason-
able reading of the Commission's history."5
Of course there are subtleties here. The Commission's rulemak-
ing process, by good sense and statute, includes a public notice and
comment period. We want to understand the concerns of affected
constituencies. At times, as may have happened with mutual funds,
the Commission has been lulled into a false sense of security. At other
times, it has made industry-oriented mistakes. But none of this repre-
sents "capture." Adam's general assertion of "capture" lacks historical
perspective and, for me, has no touch of reality.
With respect to the SEC's relationship to the executive and legis-
lative branches, my Columbia colleague and a former chairman of the
SEC, Bill Cary, had the correct analysis. He concluded that "govern-
ment regulatory agencies are stepchildren whose custody is contested
by both Congress and the Executive, but without much affection from
either one."' 6 That is reality.
I am skeptical, to say the least, about Adam's assertion that the
SEC would get more affection-or would be more effective-as part
of the executive branch. But I am wise enough (at least while holding
my present job) not to express an opinion about Adam's faith in the
White House. It is, however, critical to understand that there are real
advantages to being an institutional stepchild. While the Commission
must obviously try to work well with both the executive and legislative
branches, its separation from each of them affords it a meaningful
measure of autonomy. Its autonomy and independent status have un-
doubtedly, in my view, provided the Commission with significant insu-
lation from business and political pressures over the years, and this
has worked very much in the public's interest.
Finally, Adam's dismemberment of the SEC would jeopardize the
quality, transparency, continuity, and coherence of securities regula-
5 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET xix (3d ed. 2003).
6 Id. at viii.
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tion; it would also jeopardize the quality and dedication of the Com-
mission's very talented staff. While reorganizing a weak agency on its
seventieth anniversary might make sense, the SEC is now too vigorous
and too vital for anyone to take Adam's proposal seriously. As Senator
Paul Sarbanes put it recently:
The challenge is not just to clean up recent scandals, but to create a
solid framework for the future. In carrying out its responsibilities,
the SEC is fortunate to have men and women of uncommon dedica-
tion and competence who have built its standing as the crown jewel
among regulatory agencies.
7
I agree completely with Senator Sarbanes's "crown jewel" point. To
the students in the room: think about a career with the agency in
Washington or in the regions. The SEC is a wonderful place to work.
I wanted to spend time on the agenda of the Commission, but we
really don't have much time left. Let me list key items on a checklist
of things to do this fall, winter, and spring. We have got to finish up
on mutual fund reform. Much has been done, but there are still some
disclosure issues and correctives for abusive timing and late trading
that are needed.
Hedge funds, which are a lively political issue, will be coming
back to the Commission. But don't pay any attention to those who tell
you we are protecting only the wealthy in requiring registration of ad-
visers to hedge funds. Hedge funds are no longer dealing just with
the assets of the wealthy. More and more, the general public's savings
and charitable funds are being put at risk. Hedge funds are involved
with large and sharply increasing amounts from private and public
pension funds, funds of hedge funds, and endowments and other
charitable institutions. Under the rules of the game now, plumbers,
cab owners, lawyers, and pharmacists all are qualified to invest.
Moreover, we know too little about this dramatically growing in-
dustry, and what we do know has alarm bells ringing, at least for me.
Eight or ten years ago, hedge funds held roughly $100 billion in as-
sets. In September 2003, an SEC staff report put the figure at $600
billion. When the Commission acted on its proposed rulemaking in
July 2004, hedge fund assets were estimated to be $850 billion. Most
estimates suggest that there will be a trillion dollars in hedge funds by
the end of 2004. Furthermore, all of these figures are from industry
sources and are unreliable. Some Wall Street estimates have sug-
gested a $1.5 trillion figure. We need accurate information about the
aggregate size of hedge funds, about how leveraged they may be,
7 Senator Paul Sarbanes, The SEC: A New Era, Address at the SEC (June 8,
2004).
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about their trading patterns, etc. More-and more accurate-infor-
mation will both protect investors and significantly enhance the Com-
mission's ability to protect our securities markets.
Finally, there has been a recent increase in cases involving hedge
fund fraud, both on hedge fund investors (e.g., involving misappropri-
ation, false valuation, and fraudulent promotion) and on others. Ca-
nary Capital and too many other unregistered hedge fund advisers
had a corrupting influence (e.g., through "sticky assets" and side pay-
ments) on mutual funds that resulted in the late trading and abusive
market timing scandals. In my view, hedge funds are properly an im-
portant part of the Commission's fall agenda.
Rating agencies are on the agenda, as are a critical number of
market structure issues involving the stock exchanges. There will be
new proposals on disclosure and governance at our so-called SROs.
And, of course, we have my favorite, the proxy access proposals, which
I strongly commend to you, but will not bother to speak about now.
Finally, I would like to make a new proposal, inspired by a
"golden age" at the SEC. From 1961 through 1963, while Bill Cary was
Chairman, a Special Study of the Securities Markets was conducted.
The Special Study was staffed by about forty full-time lawyers, econo-
mists, statisticians, and analysts, only a relative few of whom were SEC
staff members. Joel Seligman concluded that the Special Study was
"the single most influential document published in the history of the
SEC."8 The Special Study's findings and recommendations formed
the basis for the Commission's reform efforts over the next decade or
two. Today, globalization issues (e.g., with respect to corporate gov-
ernance, accounting, and financial markets), the effectiveness of our
disclosure and SRO listing and regulatory schemes, market structure
issues, the appropriateness of the separate ways we regulate broker-
dealers and investment advisers, corporate governance, and a number
of other "large" issues could profitably be studied to help chart the
Commission's course over the next ten or twenty years.
Let me close on an optimistic note. Over the past two years, seri-
ous SEC rulemakings and enforcement actions have occurred in area
after area. Disclosure, officers and directors, accountants, lawyers,
mutual funds, and others in the financial community have been dealt
with sensibly and with balance. Serious commentators from the aca-
demic community and elsewhere will have to evaluate how well the
SEC has done. I am certainly not an unbiased observer. Nevertheless,
I am hopeful-and even confident-that these commentators will
conclude that the current Commission has maintained and strength-
8 SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 299.
[VOL. 8o:3
2005] KEYNOTE ADDRESS 835
ened the position of the United States as the world's leader in finan-
cial disclosure, financial market effectiveness, and corporate
accountability.
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